Field Trial of Dynamic DV-QKD Networking in the SDNControlled Fully-Meshed Optical Metro Network of the Bristol City 5GUK Test Network by Stange Tessinari, Rodrigo et al.
                          Stange Tessinari, R., Bravalheri, A. C., Hugues Salas, E., Silva Guimaraes,
R. S., Alia, O., Kanellos, G., ... Simeonidou, D. (2019). Field Trial of
Dynamic DV-QKD Networking in the SDNControlled Fully-Meshed Optical
Metro Network of the Bristol City 5GUK Test Network. Paper presented at
ECOC 2019, Brussels, Belgium.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
 1 
 
Field Trial of Dynamic DV-QKD Networking in the SDN-
Controlled Fully-Meshed Optical Metro Network of the 
Bristol City 5GUK Test Network 
Rodrigo S. Tessinari1, Anderson Bravalheri1, Emilio Hugues-Salas1, Richard Collins2, Djeylan Aktas2, Rafael. 
S. Guimaraes1, Obada Alia1, John Rarity2, George T. Kanellos1, Reza Nejabati1, and Dimitra Simeonidou1 
1High Performance Network Group, University of Bristol, UK  
2Quantum Engineering Technology Labs, University of Bristol, UK 
*gt.kanellos@bristol.ac.uk  
 
Keywords: QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION, OPTICAL SWITCHING, OPTICAL NETWORK 
Abstract 
We demonstrate for the first time a field trial of a fully meshed metro network with dynamic QKD networking capabilities 
across four optical network nodes in the 5GUK Test Network, where the DV-QKD quantum channels co-exist with classical 
channels and are dynamically switched and rerouted utilising QKD-aware SDN control.
1 Introduction 
Emerging 5G services are high-bandwidth, low-latency cloud-
based services that often require optical network connectivity 
between end-users and compute resources at the edge of the 
network (MEC or FOG computing paradigms [1]) and in 
remote data centres. However, in the distributed and highly 
dynamic environment of the emerging 5G services now raises 
security as a critically important aspect that must be provided 
in an end-to-end fashion. 
QKD technology has been brought into perspective as the 
ultimate physical layer security. However, in order to become 
functional for practical 5G scenarios, it must be integrated with 
the classical optical networking infrastructure and adapt to the 
dynamic environment on the metro/edge part of the 5G 
networks. Current filed-deployed QKD secured networks are 
mainly based on point-to-point, static links on dedicated fibre 
connectivity [2]. These QKD network deployments have so far 
relied on the use of trusted nodes [3], where the content of 
QKD channels from one link has to be connected using some 
form of key management [3] with the next link. In a recent 
field trial demo in Madrid [4], dynamic QKD networking in a 
metro ring network scenario has been demonstrated with CV-
QKD technology going through a commercial optical switch. 
However, to the best of authors knowledge, there is no field 
trial reporting on dynamic networking with DV-QKD. DV-
QKD scheme poses significantly more technical challenges in 
switching and co-existence with classical optical channels. 
This is mainly due to DV-QKD protocol requirement for 
few/single photon based QKD [5]. Furthermore, Dynamic 
QKD in a meshed network scenario (for both DV and CV 
QKDs) still is a major challenge and there is no previous 
reported field trial.  
Recently authors have demonstrated in the lab a quantum-
ROADM implementation with the ability to simultaneously 
mix and route any combination of classical and DV-QKD 
channels in any of the four ROADM degrees [6], as the 
ultimate switching element towards quantum-secured WDM 
optical networks for inter-domain 5G services. 
In this paper, we take advantage of the low optical losses of 
fibre transmission in the metro network and combine it with 
ultra-low losses of optical MEMS switching technologies [7], 
to demonstrate that the limited power budget of DV-QKD 
technologies can still be efficiently applied with dynamic 
metro optical networking scenarios to provide quantum secure 
communication between computing resources at the edge and 
5G access points. We demonstrate for the first time a field trial 
of a fully meshed network with dynamically switched DV-
QKD capabilities supporting the co-existence of classical 
optical channels in the same fibre as QKD channel. The 
network comprises four optical network nodes across Bristol 
city, including the 5G access point in Millennium Square 
(WTC) and in 1 Cathedral Sq. as well as the University of 
Bristol campus nodes of HPN Group and QETLabs (NSQI), as 
depicted in figures 1.A and 2A. The four sites are connected 
through the metro optical network (with dynamic optical 
switching capabilities) of 5GUK Test Network in a meshed 
topology. We demonstrate simultaneous classical/quantum 
dynamic switching for continuous transmission of quantum-
encrypted data using a QKD-aware Software Defined Network 
(SDN) Control Plane that provides continuous and optimal 
quantum secured connectivity in the meshed network scenario.  
 
Fig. 1. A) Bristol City map with the location of each node and 
distance of the fibre links. B) Block diagram of QtunnelServer 
application to encrypt/decrypt data with AES using quantum keys. 
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2. The testbed 
2.1 Data Plane Connectivity 
The network comprises four nodes in a full mesh physical 
topology across the Bristol City metro area as shown in  
Fig. 1.A. All four nodes are equipped either with an Alice 
(WTC, 1CS) or Bob (HPN, NSQI) terminals of the 
commercially available IDQClavis2 DV-QKD system that 
implements the BB84 protocol. Each node employs a low loss 
optical switch with less than 2dB of optical losses while all 
fibre links are <10km, leading to a total link power budget of 
<7dB for all mesh links, safely within the 10dB power budget 
dynamic range of the IDQClavis2. The use of an optical switch 
in each node guarantees quantum and parallel classical data 
link for any-to-any node interconnection. Scalability of the 
network is determined by the number of switch ports that for 
MEMS based switches can scale to 100’s of ports [7]. In case 
of link failure or Denial of Service (DoS) attack, an additional 
maximum 1-hop may be required in such mesh-topology to re-
establish the broken link, leading to a maximum cascade of 
three switches. Each link also employs a parallel fibre for the 
classical data channel (10Gb/s SFP+ C-band interfaces) that is 
connected to the encryption server through a NIC card. This is 
in addition to the capability for co-existence of classical and 
quantum channel in the same fibre. WTC node also employs a 
BVT switch (Facebook Voyager) that provides 4x100Gb/s 25 
Gbaud PM-QPSK channels in the C-band. The BVT channels 
are coupled through a 95/5 coupler in the same fibre with the 
IDQClavis2 quantum channel in a co-existing configuration. 
A second BVT switch in HPN node receives the BVT channels 
after a band-pass rejection filter (BPRF) with 0.8dB of loss 
before the IDQClavis2 Bob1, thus establishing a co-existing 
link between WTC-HPN. Additional parallel fibres are used 
for the quantum channels service links and for providing the 
control channels interconnection with the SDN server (HPN). 
Fig. 2.B shows the full complexity of the network topology.  
2.2. SDN Control Plane  
The SDN Control Plane is responsible for the computation, 
creation, and management of the complete path that traverses 
optical and SDN switches between the nodes. SDN Controller 
is individually controlling the switches, QKD terminals, and 
encryption/application server in each node (Fig. 2.A) to create 
secure channels. The SDN controller utilises a quantum aware 
path computation mechanism, Q-PCE Fig. 2.A, that calculates 
the best path for QKD and classical channel, including power 
and modulation format for minimal effect on the QKD channel 
[10]. The quantum keys generated by the IDQClavis2 are 
managed by the SDN Control QKD Management blocks 
responsible for the creation of the quantum key tunnel using 
the in-house CQP toolkit [9]. The embedded QTunnelServer 
application is a working implementation of a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) service which uses an interface that directly 
incorporates key cycling on a configurable basis (e.g., based 
on time or data usage) and encrypts data with AES (Fig. 1.B). 
Once the end-to-end path is established, the Quantum Key 
management Block sends the quantum key information to the 
SDN Control Plane. Subsequently, the SDN Control Plane 
authorizes the end-to-end transmission between the nodes and 
encrypts the classical channel with GCM-AES-256 encryption 
scheme using the quantum keys. The application server awaits 
permission in the form of a publish-subscribe asynchronous 
message from the Control Plane to initiate or terminate 
publishing confidential information.  
On the application side, the confidential information of 2000 
customers is stored in a database. This database is sent as 
publish-subscribe asynchronous messages through a QKD-
secured channel previously established by the SDN Control 
Plane. The confidential information is displayed on the GUI 
screen in a colour-coded format, where each colour represents 
messages pertaining to a specific server (Fig. 3.F and 3.I). 
3 Results  
To evaluate the performance of the full-mesh dynamic QKD 
network, we implemented several dynamic configurations of 
the topology (Fig. 3, Steps 0, 1, and 2) with the classical data 
in co-existence or in parallel and monitored the performance 
of the QKD channel(s) in terms of QBER and SKR when the 
AES-GCM 256 encrypted data channel(s) were sustained. In 
particular, Fig. 3.A presents the static results for the quantum 
channels Q1 and Q2 (A1→B1, A2→B2) while Q1 is co-
existing with 4x100Gb/s QPSK channels (Fig. 3.E spectrum). 
The tables in figures 3.A and 3.D show the SKR variation 
between Q1-no-co-existence and Q1-co-existence while Q2 
SKR is reduced due to increased link losses. During co-
existence, the classical channels are coupled after a 1x4 
coupler with an aggregated optical power of -12dBm together 
   
Fig. 2. A) Block diagram of the field-trial dynamic QKD network. B) Actual filed trial network topology as print-screen of the interactive 
map (for Demo Step1). Coloured links are the data plane active links for quantum and classical data channels. 
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with the quantum channel. On the HPN site, the unamplified 
classical channels are directed to the Voyager BVT for 
coherent detection after the BPRF via a 1x4 optical splitter, 
and with a 15% FEC, the channels are recovered within FEC 
acceptable limits (<10x10-8) and with OSNRs of 27.04dB, 
figures 3.D and 3.H. Fig. 3.H details the performance of 
classical and quantum channels vs. the classical channels 
aggregated power at the co-existence level and reveals an 
additional power tolerance of 3dB for acceptable channels 
reception. Fig. 3.G shows the tolerance of quantum channel to 
the classical channels’ wavelengths up to 0.5 nm of spacing. 
Fig. 3.B provides a comparison for the secure link when the 
quantum channel is transmitted over two and three nodes 
respectively. Q-channel rerouting may occur in case of link 
failure or if a Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack is launched over 
the vulnerable quantum channel [8]. We used the WTC-HPN 
secure link as a reference for this comparison and compared 
the quantum channel as 1) a direct link and 2) when it is 
redirected through the NSQI node, while the classical 
encrypted data channel is not redirected. To test the SDN 
controller, at an arbitrary time the Q1 link was manually 
unplugged and the SDN controller automatically detected the 
loss of the quantum signal and commanded the rerouting of the 
quantum channel through NSQI. SDN decision was based on 
the new link overall losses that were manually configured. In 
both cases, the Q2 secure link between 1CS and NSQI remains 
unaffected. The SKR comparison for one and two hops 
(figures 3.D and 3.B) reveals a 20% drop due to the additional 
link losses induced by the optical switch. 
At this point, it should be mentioned that the nodes in our 
mesh-network implementation are not considered trusted 
nodes. Rerouting of the quantum channel relies only on 
passive optical beam-steering devices (e.g., mirrors) and once 
the optical path is established, the quantum channel 
initialization and authentication rely only on the information 
exchanged between the end nodes of the link. This is a 
significant benefit to the approach of trusted nodes. Fig. 3.C 
presents the QBER and SKR results when the two new secure 
links Q3 and Q4 have been established. In this case, A1 from 
WTC node establishes a QKD channel with B2 in NSQI, 
providing a new QKD channel Q3 that would normally require 
and additional pair of QKD devices if the mesh network was 
not in place, highlighting the optimization of resource usage as 
a benefit of the dynamic network approach. In a similar way, 
a fourth quantum channel Q4 establishes a fourth secure link 
between A2→B1. In order to achieve successful 
authentication for the new quantum secure channels, B1 and 
B2 have to share the same pre-shared key. Figures 3.F and 3.I 
shows the GUI that monitored the progress of the encrypted 
databases been transmitted only when the quantum-secure 
channels were sustained. Messages from Q1 (WTC-HPN) are 
displayed in red (Fig. 3.F), whereas the messages from Q2 
(1CS-NSQI) are displayed in blue (Fig. 3.I). When the Control 
Plane implements the switching to setup Q3 (WTC-NSQI) and 
Q4 (1CS-HPN), the messages appear in yellow (Fig. 3.F) and 
green (Fig. 3.I) respectively indicating the initialization of the 
new secure channels. The progress bar shows the status of data 
transmission based on the number of customers and gives the 
percentage of pending messages. 
4 Conclusion 
We have demonstrated for the first time a dynamic QKD 
networking implementation over a field-trial testbed that 
spanned across four optical nodes interconnected in full-mesh 
topology. Indicative results of dynamic setup for quantum-
secure optical channels transmission were presented revealing 
the resource allocation and rerouting advantages for QKD 
networking. 
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Fig. 3. A) Q1 and Q2 parallel secure links with Q1 in co-existence with 4x100G channels, B) three-hop quantum secure channel, C) Q3 and 
Q4 secure channels established after switching, D) performance of co-existent channels, E) spectrum of 4x100G co-existent channels, F) , I) 
GUI for encrypted database transmission for Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 secure links, G), H) Co-existence analysis vs. channel spacing and input power. 
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